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The Evolution of the Labor Market
for Medical Interns and Residents:
A Case Study in Game Theory
Alvin E. Roth
U  n i  v e  r  s  i   t   y of  Pittsburgh 
The organization of the labor market for medical interns and resi-
dents underwent a number of changes before taking its present
form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that
prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces
at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a
brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain
the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in con-
trast to the turmoil that characterized various earlier short-lived at-
tempts to organize the market. An analysis is also given of some
contemporary problems facing the market. A subsidiary theme of
the paper concerns the history of ideas: the problems encountered
in the organization of this market, and some of the solutions arrived
at, anticipated the discussion of such issues in the literature of eco-
nomics and game theory.
I. Introduction
This paper concerns the labor market for medical interns and resi-
dents and how it has evolved from the beginning of the century to the
present time. The paper will discuss briefly the history of the various
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institutional procedures by which this market has been implemented
and present a formal theoretical analysis of what these procedures
accomplished and the problems they encountered.
From the turn of the century until 1945, the market suffered from
a Prisoner’s Dilemma problem in which competition by hospitals for
interns manifested itself in a race to sign employment contracts ear-
lier and earlier in a medical student’s career. This problem was suc-
cessfully resolved in 1945, but the market then suffered for several
years from a “recontracting problem, ” in which the market’s failure to
implement an outcome in the core made it difficult for the market to
clear. This recontracting problem was closely related to an “incentive
problem” that put a premium on strategic behavior by market partici-
pants, which manifested itself most clearly when a centralized market
mechanism was introduced in 1950. All of these problems were ap-
parently resolved, at least in large part, by the adoption of a different
centralized market mechanism in 195 1, which remains in use to this
day.
It will be shown that this mechanism implements an outcome in the
core of the market, and some of its other properties will be studied.
Some modern problems this market mechanism has encountered and
the theoretical issues they raise will also be considered. One of the
most interesting of these concerns the transformation of the market
into one containing dual-career households, as increasing numbers of
medical school graduates are married to one another and need to be
employed in nearby locations. It will be shown that no core outcomes
need exist in such markets.
A subsidiary theme explored in this paper concerns the history of
ideas. It will be noted that the practical problems encountered by the
medical profession in the organization of this labor market, and some
of the solutions proposed, anticipate by a number of years the discus-
sion of similar issues in the literature of economics and game theory.
Section II briefly discusses the history of the market, and Section
III presents an analysis. Section IV analyzes some current problems
facing the market. All proofs are presented in Sections V and VI, and
Section VII concludes.
II. Some Institutional History
The internship was first introduced around the turn of the century as
an optional form of postgraduate medical education. For students,
internships offered a concentrated exposure to clinical medicine, and
for hospitals they offered a supply of relatively cheap labor. The
number of positions offered for interns was, from the beginning,
greater than the number of graduating medical students applying for
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such positions,’ and there was considerable competition among hospi-
tals for interns.
One form in which this competition manifested itself was that hos-
pitals attempted to set the date at which they would finalize binding
agreements with interns a little earlier than their principal competi-
tors. As a result, the date by which most internships had been
finalized began to creep forward from the end of the senior year of
medical school. This was regarded as costly and inefficient both by the
hospitals, who had to appoint interns without knowing their final
grades or class standings, and by the students and medical schools,
who found that much of the senior year was disrupted by the process
of seeking desirable appointments. Many resolutions were passed and
much moral suasion was applied in efforts to remedy this state of
affairs. A good idea of the situation in 1926 is conveyed in a letter to
the Association of American Medical Colleges (Darrach 1927), the
body of which is quoted in full:
For a number of years attempts have been made to defer
the appointment of hospital internes until towards the close
of the fourth year. The Association of American Medical
Colleges, the Council on Medical Education of the American
Medical Association, and the American Hospital Association
have all passed resolutions favoring this idea. The difficulty
has been in persuading someone to take the lead.
This is to inform you that it has been decided to defer the
appointments of internes at the Presbyterian Hospital in the
City of New York until some time in April.
It is earnestly hoped that other hospitals and schools will
be able to act in a similar manner.
The advancement of the date of appointment was not halted, much
less reversed, by these appeals and resolutions. A dozen years later, in
an article devoted to the problem, Fitz (1939, p. 103) referred to
Darrach’s letter and added that “for some unknown reason the Pres-
byterian Hospital soon abandoned its stand . . . .” He reported the
results of a survey indicating that, in 1939, the bulk of intern appoint-
ments would be made during the Christmas holidays of the senior
year, and many would be made earlier. He proposed that the problem
could be solved if medical schools in the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) would undertake not to give out before
r The number of positions,offered for first-year medical graduates exceeded the
number of eligible applicants until the mid-1970s. at which time the total of U.S.
medical school graduates plus foreign graduates exceeded the number of first-year
positions. However, the number of positions offered continues to exceed the number
of U.S. medical school graduates (see Graettinger 1976).
994 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
some agreed date any information to hospitals regarding students’
abilities. This suggestion was not adopted, however.
The advancement of the date of appointment continued at an ac-
celerating pace, and in an address to the AAMC  on the problem in
1944, Turner (1945, p. 27) reported that the standard appointment
date “has now been advanced on the school calendar to the beginning
of the junior year nd, indeed, inquiries now come to me even from
sophomores” (emphasis added). Thus in 1944 the date of appoint-
ment had advanced to 2 full years before the internship was actually
to begin.
Turner proposed a number of steps to remedy this increasingly
intolerable state of affairs. Most important, he again proposed that no
information about medical students should be released by medical
schools before some fixed date to be agreed upon. This proposal was
adopted by the AAMC in consultation with the various hospital asso-
ciations, and it was decided that neither scholastic transcripts nor
letters of reference would be released prior to the end of the junior
year for students seeking internships commencing in 1946.
This proved to be an effective remedy for the problem it was in-
tended to solve. Appointments for 1946 internships were largely
made in the summer of 1945, and in subsequent years the dates at
which information was released by medical schools was moved later
into the senior year, and the date at which appointments were made
followed in step. However, a new problem appeared and manifested
itself in the waiting period between the time offers of internships
were first made and the time students were required to accept them.
The problem was that a student who was offered an internship at,
say, his third-choice hospital, and who was informed he was an alter-
nate (i.e., on a waiting list) at his second-choice hospital, would be
inclined to wait as long as possible before accepting the position he
had been offered, in the hope of eventually being offered a prefera-
ble position. Students who were pressured into accepting offers be-
fore their alternate status was resolved were unhappy if they were
ultimately offered a preferable position, and hospitals whose candi-
dates waited until the last minute to reject them were unhappy if their
preferred alternate candidates had in the meantime already accepted
positions. Hospitals were unhappier still when a candidate who had -
indicated acceptance subsequently failed to fulfil  his commitment af-
ter receiving a preferable offer. In response to pressure originating
chiefly from the hospitals, a series of small procedural adjustments
were made in the years 1945-51. The nature of these adjustments,
described next, makes clear how these problems were perceived by
the parties involved.
For 1945, it was resolved that hospitals should allow students 10
MARKET FOR MEDICAL INTERNS 995
days after an offer had been made to consider whether to accept or
reject it.” For 1946,” it was resolved that there should be a uniform
appointment date (July 1) on which offers should be tendered (tran-
scripts having been released on June 1) and that acceptance or rejec-
tion should not be required before July 8.4 By 1949, the AAMC
proposed (“Uniform Intern Placement Plan” 1949) that appoint-
ments should be made by telegram at 12:01 A.M., November 15, with
applicants not required to accept or reject them until 12:00 noon the
same day. Even this 12-hour waiting period was rejected by the Amer-
ican Hospital Association (AHA)  as too long: the joint resolution
(“Appointment of Interns” 1949) finally agreed on contained the
phrase “no specified waiting period after 12:01 A.M. is obligatory” and
specifically noted that telegrams could be filed in advance for delivery
precisely at 12:Ol  A.M. In 1950, the resolution again included a 12-
hour period for consideration, with the specific injunction that “hos-
pitals and/or students shall not follow telegrams of offers of appoint-
ment with telephone calls” until the end of this period.5
By this time it was widely recognized both that there were serious
problems in the last stage of the matching process and that these
problems could not adequately be resolved by compressing this last
stage into a shorter and shorter time period. In order to avoid these
problems and the costs they imposed, it was proposed, and ultimately
agreed, that a more centralized matching procedure should be tried
(Mullin  1950; Mullin  and Stalnaker 1951). Under this procedure,
students and hospitals would continue to make contact and exchange
information as before.” (It is worth noting in this regard that the
complete job description offered by a hospital program in a given
year was customarily specified in advance; see, e.g., Stalnaker [ 19531.
Thus the responsibilities, salary, etc., associated with a given intern-
* Unless otherwise stated, the resolutions discussed below are joint resolutions of the
AAMC and the American Hospital Association (AHA). These resolutions were not
legally binding on the member hospitals or on graduating students. For the first,
see “Agreement on Internship Placement” (1945).
’ See “Report of the Committee on Internships” (1946). Of the previous year’s reso-
lution it is noted that “while not observed completely by a few medical schools and
hospitals, [it] had been followed by most of the institutions in the country and had
resulted in a very great advance in bringing order out of a chaotic situation.”
4 “it was reported by a representative of the American Hospital Association that
violations by hospitals was as high as 25 percent: nevertheless the American Hospital
Association wants the system to be continued” (“Internships” 1947, p. 46).
’ “Modifications of Cooperative Plan for Appointment of Interns” (1950). Note that
the injunction against telephone calls was two way, in order to stem a flood of calls both
from hospitals seeking to pressure students into an immediate decision and from stu-
dents seeking to convert their alternate status into a firm offer.
6 That is, the application and interviewing process would remain unchanged. (At this
time Mullin [1950] states there were about 9,300 internships being offered, to about
6,000 medical school graduates.)
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ship, while they might be adjusted from year to year in response to a
hospital’s experience in the previous year’s market, were not a subject
of negotiation with individual candidates.) Students would then rank
in order of preference the hospital programs to which they had ap-
plied, hospitals would similarly rank their applicants, and all parties
would submit these rankings to a central bureau, which would use this
information to arrange a matching of students to hospitals and in-
form the parties of the result.7 A specific algorithm was proposed to
produce a matching from the submitted rankings, and this will be
discussed in the next section.
It was agreed to try the proposed procedure in a trial run for the
1950-5 1 market, which would not be used actually to match students
and hospitals in that year. Instead, participants were asked to submit
rankings as if they would be used for determining the final matching,
and the plan would be evaluated for actual use after the trial run had
occurred. On the basis of the trial run, the relevant medical associa-
tions agreed to adopt the procedure for the 1951-52 market. The
procedure was to be voluntary: students and hospitals were both free
either to participate in the process or to seek internship appointments
on their own.
After the procedure was announced but before it was imple-
mented, objections by student representatives were raised to the al-
gorithm used to produce a matching from the rankings submitted.
Specifically, they observed that this algorithm made it a matter of
great importance how adroitly a student composed his rank-order
list. A student might suffer if he took a “flyer” and gave high rank to
hospitals he preferred but had little chance of being matched with
(“The Internship Matching Plan” 1952). That is, it was noted that a
student who submitted a rank order of hospitals corresponding to his
true preferences might receive a less preferable match than if he had
submitted a different rank order. In response to these objections, a
new algorithm was substituted for the old in the 1951-52 matching
plan (Mullin  and Stalnaker 1952). This substitution was judged to be
of sufficiently small import that its details were not widely dis-
seminated, the announcements concerning the plan having already
been distributed before the substitution was made.
In what follows, the initial algorithm will be called the “trial-run
’ Under the procedure being discussed here, hospitals actually tanked students in
groups, rather than in a strict rank order, although in the procedure discussed next,
hospitals as well as students submitted strict rank orders. Surveys of medical students
(see, e.g., Rutkow and Glasgow 1978) suggest that the most important factors determin-
ing student preferences over hospital programs have to do with their reputation as
educational programs, less importance being assigned to factors such as on-call sched-
ule, patient population, and salary.
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algorithm,” and the algorithm that replaced it will be called the
“NIMP algorithm,” for National Intern Matching Program, the name
adopted for this plan in 1953. The matching plan using the NIMP
algorithm remains in use to this day, although the market that it
serves has undergone considerable change in the intervening years8
This longevity and the very high levels of (voluntary) participation the
system has attracted are particularly surprising in view of the turmoil
in this market in the years immediately prior to the establishment of
the N1MP.a Much of the theoretical analysis in the following section is
intended to shed light on the causes of this success.
III. Theoretical Analysis
The reasons for continually advancing the date at which interns were
appointed before 1945 are well understood, and little need be said
about them here. Although hospitals all preferred as late an appoint-
ment date as possible, each preferred to appoint its interns earlier
than its competitors: the situation is well modeled as a multiple-agent
Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, the negative externality produced by
this competitive behavior on the part of hospitals was also experi-
enced by the medical schools, which had no corresponding incentive
to advance the appointment date. Consequently, once medical schools
collectively imposed a date before which they would not release the
information about students needed to make appointments, a new
equilibrium was created at which there was no tendency for the date
to advance.”
s In 1968 the National Intern Matching Program (NIMP) was renamed the National
Intern and Resident Matching Program (NIRMP), and in 1978 renamed the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP), to reflect changes in the structure of post-
graduate medical training.
’ In the first years, over 95 percent of eligible students and hospitals participated in
the system (cf. Mullin and Stalnaker 1952.) These high rates of participation continued
until the early 1970s (see Checker 1973), after which there was some decline, for
reasons that will be discussed later.
” The importance of the medical schools’ acting collectively in this regard was em-
phasized in Curran (1945, p. 37) as follows: “While the Executive Council has already
recommended that no letters of recommendation supporting internship applications
should go out until after the end of the junior year, Dr. Turner’s insistence that this be
agreed on by all the medical schools is worthy of emphasis, Its importance may be
illustrated by a situation created one year ago among the schools in New York City by
such an agreement on a local basis. It was then discovered that in two neighboring cities
all internship vacancies were being filled by students before the end of the third year.
As a result, the New York schools were forced to abrogate hastily their rule against
sending out earlier information.”
YYO
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To analyze the market after 1945, it will be helpful to consider it as a
game whose players are a set H = {h,, . . . , /L,}  of hospital programs
offering positions to first-year graduates, and a set S = {s,, . . . , s,} of
graduating students. Each hospital program h, has some number q1 of’
identical first-year positions it is seeking to fill, and each student is
seeking one position.” The rules of the game are that any student
may fill any position if and only if both the student and the hospital
agree, that is, if and only if the position is proferred by the hospital
and accepted by the student. Each student has preferences over all
the hospital programs he is willing to accept, and each hospital pro-
gram similarly has preferences over all the students it is willing to
accept. ” An agent who is not indifferent between any two acceptable
alternatives (so that his preferences constitute a rank ordering) will be
said to have strict preferences. An outcome of the game is an assign-
ment of students to hospital programs, with no more than qz students
being assigned to any program h,. A given outcome x is called unstable
if some student or hospital receives an unacceptable assignment or if
there exists a hospital program h, and student s, who each prefer the
other to their assignment at x.
Formally, for each hospital program h,, let s,P(h,)sk  denote that h,
prefers students, to student Sk, let s,l(h,)sk  denote that h, is indifferent
between the two, let s,P(hi)u denote that h, prefers filling a position
with student si to leaving it unfilled, and let uP(h,)s,  denote the re-
verse. Then each h, has preferences defined over its set {s, E
Sls,P(h,)u} of acceptable students. Similarly, each student .s, has pref-
erences defined over his set {/z,  E Hlh,P(s,)u} of acceptable hospital
programs. ‘s An outcome is represented by a function x: S -+ H U {u},
with I{s,/x,(s,)  = h,}] s q,.14 F or any s, in S, x(+) = h, denotes that sI is
” A hospital typically offers a number of different kinds of positions, but these
are separated into different programs, each administered separately.
I2 Students may regard some hospital programs as unacceptable and hospitals may so
regard some students, in the sense that it would be preferable to defer taking or
offering nn)r appointment rather than one that is unacceptable. For example, students
and hospitals who have not exchanged the necessary preliminary information (e.g.,
transcripts and interviews) may be expected to regard one another as unacceptable (at
least for the time being). Since interviews are time consuming, students face a problem
in deciding what hospitals to apply to, and hospitals face a similar problem in deciding
whom to invite for interviews, but these problems will not be addressed here.
I3 We will not need to be concerned over what an agent’s preferences may be over
those alternatives that are unacceptable. However, the formal description of the game
given here is incomplete in another respect as well, since the preferences of hospitals
for groups of students have not been specified (see Roth 19846). The description given
here will nevertheless be complete enough for the purposes of this paper.
I4 For any set T, 17’1 denotes the number of elements in T, o, e.g., I{s,lx(s,) = h,}j is the
number of students employed by h, at the outcome X.
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assigned a position in hospital program hi, and x(si) = u denotes that Sj
is unassigned. For any h, in H let x(h,) = { is in S]x(s,)  = hi} be the set of
students assigned to h,, it being understood Ihat if ]x(hi)l  < 9, then q2 -
]x(h,)l positions are unfilled in program h,. An outcome x is unstable if
for some student sj, uP(s,)x(s,);  or if for some hospital program hi,
uP( hi)+ for some si in x( h,); or if there exists a hospital program hi and
student Sj such that both (i) h,P(s,)x(q)  and (ii) sIP( for u in x(&) if
Ix(hj)l = q1 or u in x(h,) U {u} if ]x(hj)]  < qi.
Thus an outcome is unstable if it gives some student or hospital
program an unacceptable (not individually rational) assignment or if
there exists a students, and hospital program h, such that (i) s1 prefers
h, to the hospital x(+) and (ii) h, prefers “j to the incumbent in one of its
91 available positions. When no confusion will result, a hospital pro-
gram will henceforth sometimes be referred to simply as a hospital.
An outcome that is not unstable in this sense is called stable, and it is
straightforward to verify that the set of stable outcomes is the core
defined by weak domination of this game.15  Denote the set of stable
outcomes by C(P), where P is the (m + n)-tuple of agent preferences;
that is, P = [P(h,),  . . . , P(h,),  P(sr), . . . , P(s~)].  The vector P will
sometimes be called the preference profile.
Consider now a set of job offers from hospitals to (acceptable) stu-
dents, which, if the students each accept the best of the offers they
have received (including the possibility of remaining unmatched),
would result in an unstable outcome x. The fact that x is unstable
means that there is a hospital hi and a student sI who would both
prefer to x another outcome at w,hich  s1 was employed by h,. So these
two agents have an incentive to try to locate each other, and we might
expect to witness the kind of last-minute turmoil observed in the
intern market prior to 195 1. Looking at the other side of the coin, we
might expect that any voluntary system of organizing the market
would experience similar turmoil if it produced unstable outcomes.”
Since the NIMP is a voluntary system that has maintained a high
degree of orderly participation for many years, it is reasonable to
” For markets with side payments, the core defined by weak domination coincides
with the core defined by strong domination, and in the market studied here, when 9z =
1 for each hospital h,, the two cores also coincide. However, in the more general case
considered here, the core defined by weak domination is contained in the core defined
by strong domination. See Roth and Postlewaite (1977) for a related discussion. For our
purposes, the distinction will not be consequential, and the set of stable outcomes will
henceforth be referred to simply as the core, and stable outcomes will also be called
core outcomes, However, there are differences between the special case when all 92 = 1
and the general case considered here that bear on this distinction (see Roth 19846).
I6 A system that produces tinstable outcomes gives at least some agents the incentive
to go outside the svstem to find one another and arrange their employment. Only in a
system where participation is voluntary, however,can we expect to observe agents
acting on these incentives.
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conjecture that it produces stable outcomes, that is, outcomes in the
core of the market. The following theorem, which will be proved in
Section V, supports this conjecture.
THEOREM 1: Let P be the vector of preferences (the rank-order lists)
submitted by the students and hospitals. Then the NIMP algorithm
produces an outcome in C(P).
When we consider in Section IIIB the incentives agents have to
state their true preferences, we will examine from another viewpoint
the question whether a stable outcome is achieved under the current
organization of the market. First, however, we consider some results
that concern the fact that different outcomes in the core differentially
favor the two sides of the market. Specifically, theorem 2 states that,
in a certain strong sense, the outcome produced by the NIMP al-
gorithm is the best core outcome for all the hospitals and the worst for
all the students. The following definitions will be used in stating the
theorem.
For a given preference profile P, a students, and a hospital hi will be
called achievable for one another if there is some stable outcome at
which Sj is employed by h,, that is, if there is an outcome x in C(P) such
that x(si) = hi. For each h,, let p, be the number of achievable students;
that is, pi = I{Sj(Sj  is possible for h,}(, and define ki by k, = min{gi, p,}.
Thus k, equals the minimum of the number of positions offered by hi
or the number of different students who could fill those positions at
some stable outcome.
THEOREM 2: Let P be the preference profile (i.e., the rank-order
lists) submitted by the students and hospitals. Then the outcome pro-
duced by the NIMP algorithm has the property that each hospital h, is
assigned its ki highest ranked achievable students, and each student sj
is assigned his lowest ranked achievable alternative.17
Note that not only is there no trade-off between hospitals-they all
simultaneously receive their best achievable students-but within a
hospital there need be no trade-off between achievable students. The
theorem implies, for example, that if a hospital hi with two positions
(q, = 2) employs its first- and third-ranked student at one stable
outcome and its second- and fourth-ranked student at another stable
outcome, then at the outcome produced by the NIMP algorithm it is
assigned its first- and second-ranked student. The theorem is proved
in Section V.
Note that theorems 1 and 2 can both be stated as existence results.
Theorem 1 states that the core of the market is nonempty, and
theorem 2 states that (when the preference profile consists of rank
” For a student (or hospital) who is unmatched at some stable outcome, being n -
matched will be the lowest-ranked achievable alternative.
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orderings-i.e., strict preferences) there is a core outcome that is best
for all the hospitals and worst for all the students. These existence
results were first stated by Gale and Shapley (1962), who were un-
aware of the NIMP procedure, which had then been in operation for
10 years. ‘* In order to prove these existence results, they developed
an algorithm that is considerably simpler than the NIMP algorithm
but turns out to be equivalent; that is, for a given preference profile of
strict preferences, the two algorithms produce the same stable out-
come. ig These existence results have recently been shown to hold in
considerably more general kinds of labor markets (see Kelso and
Crawford 1982; Roth 1984a,  1984d).
A corollary of the proof of theorem 2 is that there exists a stable
outcome that is optimal for students in the same sense that the out-
come described in theorem 2 is optimal for hospitals. That is, we can
state the following:
COROLLARY 2.1: For any profile P of strict preferences, there exists
a stable outcome with the property that each student sI is assigned his
highest-ranked achievable alternative.
B . Incentives
Let us now consider the incentives faced by agents when a centralized
market mechanism is employed that requires as input agents’ stated
preferences over potential assignments. The adoption of any such
mechanism creates a new game among the agents, who must decide
what preferences to state. This point can perhaps be made most
clearly by briefly considering the trial-run algorithm that was dis-
carded in favor of the NIMP algorithm because of the incentive prob-
lems it was observed to cause.
Under the trial-run procedure (see Mullin  and Stalnaker 1951),
students submitted a rank ordering of hospitals to which they had
applied, and hospitals submitted a ranking that divided students into
five groups. The hospital gave a rank of 1 to its first-choice group of
students, equal in size to the number of positions being offered; simi-
is As a historical note, I am indebted to David Gale for telling me that he first became
aware of the labor market for interns in 1976, when he was told of it by a physician who
heard him speak on the “marriage problem.” At that time, he sent a copy of Gale and
Shapley (1962) to an administrator of the NIMP, which seems to have been the first
time that anyone associated with the program became aware of the game-theoretic
formulation of the problem and the results concerning optimal outcomes in the core.
ig Gale and Shapley (1962) assumed that all agents had strict preferences. The NIMP
algorithm, since it requires its input to be rank orderings, requires all agents to state
their preferences as if they’ were strict-i.e.,no indifferences can be expressed.
Theorem 1 and the existence of stable outcomes are unchanged when agents are
indifferent between some alternatives, but we will see in Sec. IV that theorem 2 be-
comes an artifact.
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TABLE 1
AGENT
larly it gave a rank of 2 to an equal-size group of second-choice stu-
dents, ranked less desirable students 3 and 4, and ranked unaccept-
able students 5. The matching algorithm proceeded in stages, or runs.
At the first of these, called the 1 : 1 stage, students and hospitals were
matched if they had each given the other a rank of 1. The next stage
was a 1 : 2 stage, where remaining students and hospitals were
matched if the student had ranked the hospital 1 and the hospital
ranked the student 2. Then followed a 2: 1 stage, a 2: 2 stage, a 1: 3
stage, and so forth.
The difficulty observed by the student representatives after the trial
run was that a student who did not match with his first-choice hospital
might find that, say, his second-choice hospital had no places left by
the time the 2 : 1 stage rolled around, so that even if his second choice
had ranked him a 1, he might end up assigned to a lower-choice
hospital. In this case, the student would have done better to have
submitted a different rank ordering. The following example, in
which there are three students and three hospitals, each offering one
position, will make this completely clear. The rank orderings given in
table 1 correspond to the true preferences of the agents.
If the agents all submit their true rank orderings, the trial-run
algorithm finds no matches at the 1: 1 stage, and at the 1 : 2 stage it
matches sp with h2 and $3 with ht, so that s1 is ultimately matched with
hs his third choice.” However, if st had ranked his second choice h2
firit, he would have been matched with it (at the 1 : 1 stage). So s1 has
an incentive to misrepresent his preferences strategically when sub-
mitting his rank order.“’
” Note that this outcome is not stable. With respect to the preferences of the players
as given in table 1, there are exactly two stable outcomes, at both of which st is matched
with IL,.  So the hospital-optimal stable outcome x is given by x(J,) = hp, .X(Q) = h,, X(SQ)
= hS, which gives every hospital its first-choice student, The student-optimal stable
outcome y is given by (s,) = hB, y(s2) = hs, y(sB)  = hl, which gives hospitals h, and hs
their second-choice student.
et A very similar matching procedure, which exhibits precisely the same incentive
problem, is currently employed by the Fulbright Senior Scholars Awards Program,
which matches American scholars with foreign universities (see Council for Interna-
tional Exchange of Scholars 1984). I am indebted to Gene Gruver for pointing this out
to me.
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The NIMP algorithm was introduced with the claim that it solved
this problem (see Mullin  and Stdlnaker 1952; Graettinger and Peran-
son 1981). Under the NIMP procedure, both students and hospitals
submitted rank orderings. It was essentially claimed that the NIMP
algorithm made it a dominant strategy for every agent to state his true
preferences; that is, each agent could do no better than to submit a
rank ordering corresponding to his true preferences,” no matter
what preferences were submitted by other agents. The following re-
sults demonstrate that this claim is not quite correct, but that the
NIMP algorithm comes as close in a certain sense to fulfilling this
claim as is possible for a procedure that produces a stable outcome.
Theorems 3-7 will be stated here without proofs, which can be
found in Roth (1982a) (theorems 3-6) and Roth (1984b, 1984~)
(theorem 7). The first of these results is an impossibility theorem for
all stable matching procedures, which are defined to be functions
from preference profiles P to stable outcomes x(P) in C(P).
THEOREM 3: No stable matching procedure exists for which it is a
dominant strategy for all agents to state their true preferences.
Since the NIMP is a stable matching procedure, this theorem im-
plies that there are circumstances in which it gives some agents the
incentive to submit a rank ordering different from their true prefer-
ences. Specifically, the proof of this theorem in Roth (1982a) implies
that it is not a dominant strategy for students participating in the
NIMP to state their true preferences. However, the following results
show that the NIMP procedure offers some relief from the incentive
problems present in the trial-run algorithm that it replaced.‘”
THEOREM 4: The NIMP procedure gives no student any incentive
to misrepresent his true first choice.
In particular, any student who submits a rank ordering whose first
element differs from his true first choice could always do at least as
well by submitting an otherwise identical rank ordering whose first
element is his true first choice. The example considered above shows
that the NIMP procedure contrasts in this respect with the trial-run
algorithm.
” Let P* be some agent’s true preference ordering, and let P be the rank ordering he
submits, which is necessarily a strict ordering. If the true preferences P* are also strict,
then P corresponds to P* if and only if P = P*. If the true preferences P* are not strict,
then P corresponds to P* if and only if the fact that one alternative is strictly preferred
to another under P* implies it is strictly preferred under P. (So if P* expresses indiffer-
ence between two alternatives, either may be ranked higher under P corresponding to
P*.)
s3 In Roth (1982a, 19846), theorems 4, 5, and 7 were stated in terms of a stable
matching procedure that always yielded the optimal stable outcome for a given side of
the market. From the point of view of incentives, any two such procedures are equiva-
lent. Here, therefore, the theorems can be stated in terms of the N I M P  procedure,
which by theorems 1 and 2 yields the hospital-optimal stable outcome.
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Since students are each assigned to only one hospital, the model
presented here is adequate for discussing their incentives, since their
preferences are defined over hospitals and their strategies involve
rank orderings of hospitals. However, in order to discuss adequately
the incentives facing hospitals that have more than one position to fill,
it would be necessary to specify their preferences over groups of
students. A complete description of the general case would take us
well beyond the scope of this paper. But for the simple case of hospi-
tals with only one position to fill (qi = l), the model discussed here is
complete enough to allow us to state the following.
THEOREM 5: The NIMP procedure makes it a dominant strategy for
all hospitals with one position to state their true preferences.
The NIMP procedure thus avoids some of the simple opportunities
for misrepresentation offered by the trial-run aIgorithm. No student
can profit from misrepresenting his first choice, and in the simple case
in which hospitals have only a single position to offer, it is a dominant
strategy for hospitals to state their true preferences.24 The following
result shows that, in a certain sense, the NIMP procedure does as well
as possible in this regard; no stable procedure exists that does all this
and that also never makes it profitable for a student to misrepresent
his second choice (even in the simple case in which hospitals have only
single positions).
THEOREM 6: No stable matching procedure exists for which it is
a dominant strategy for all agents to state their true kth choice, for
k# 1.
In view of the fact that the NIMP procedure does not make it a
dominant strategy for students to state their true preferences, we
must now reconsider what reason there is to believe that the NIMP
procedure in practice yields a stable outcome (in terms of the true
preferences of the agents). That is, theorem 1 states that, for any
preference profile P of submitted rank-order lists, the NIMP proce-
dure yields an outcome in C(P), that is, a stable outcome with respect
to the stated preferences. But since some students may have an incen-
tive to misrepresent their preferences, the stated preferences P may
not coincide with the true preferences P*. What reason, then, do we
have to believe that the outcome produced will be stable with respect
to the true preferences? To put it another way, how can we explain
the empirical fact that the NIMP procedure has produced an orderly
24 Theorem 5 is included here to help illustrate the manner in which the NIMP
procedure comes close to achieving its desired aim of giving neither students nor
hospitals any incentive to misrepresent their preferences. However, it is shown in Roth
(19846) that the NIMP procedure does not in general make it a dominant strategy for
hospital programs having more than one position to state their true preferences, and
that in fact no stable matching procedure exists that has this property for such hospi-
tal programs.
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market since 195 1, in contrast to the turmoil associated with the insta-
bility characteristic of the earlier forms of market organization it re-
placed?
Two kinds of answers can be given to this, depending on how much
information the agents possess. First, if agents have little information
about the preferences of other agents, they will not in general be able
to determine an “optimal” misrepresentation. Together with the fact
that the literature distributed to students and hospitals with the forms
for their rank-order lists continues to claim that it is optimal to submit
true preferences, this may persuade them to submit their true prefer-
ences. If so, the resulting outcome would be stable.
However, there is at least anecdotal evidence that many students
are not persuaded that it is optimal to submit their true preferences,
and there is substantial information available to them about the his-
torical preferences of hospitals and students (e.g., which hospitals are
prestigious, and what kind of medical-school records their interns
must typically have to get an appointment). We must therefore con-
sider whether it is consistent to expect that a stable outcome will result
from the NIMP procedure when agents are rational and well in-
formed, that is, when stated preferences can be expected to differ
from true preferences. The traditional formulation in game theory of
how such agents behave is that their stated preferences (i.e., strategy
choices) will constitute a Nash equilibrium, so that each agent’s stated
preference gets him the best match obtainable, given the stated pref-
erences of the others. The following theorem states that it is consis-
tent to expect, in this case also, that the NIMP procedure will result in
a stable outcome.
THEOREM 7: There exist Nash equilibria P of submitted rank-order
lists such that the outcome produced by the NIMP procedure is stable
with respect not only to P, but also to the true preferences P*. That is,
the NIMP outcome is contained in C(P*) as well as in C(P).
IV. Contemporary Issues
We now turn to some contemporary issues that have been raised
concerning the present operation of the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP). In a certain sense, each of these issues concerns the
underlying demographics of the market.
When the NIMP algorithm was first employed, there were many
more internships being offered than there were students to fill them,
and consequently all core outcomes were rather favorable for stu-
dents. By the mid-1970s,  however, the inclusion of foreign medical
school graduates in the matching program had succeeded in closing
the gap between the number of applicants and positions offered, and
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outcomes in the core were no longer so favorable to students.” It is
thus not surprising that the question of whether the NIMP algorithm
unfairly favors hospitals at the expense of students eventually became
an issue.‘6 However, the following result shows that the conflict of
interest between students as a group and hospitals as a group
evidenced in theorem 2 is at least partly an artifact of the NIMP
procedure’s requirement that participants submit rank orders (i.e.,
strict preferences) even when they may be indifferent between some
potential matches.
‘THEOREM 8: When preferences are not all strict, there may exist no
two stable outcomes such that all hospitals prefer one and all students
prefer the other.
Thus when preferences are not strict, it is not in general meaning-
ful to speak of a procedure that favors hospitals over students. In the
example used in the proof of this theorem, in Section VI, any stable
procedure must favor some hospitals and students at the expense of
other hospitals and students.
Another issue that has been raised concerns the geographic distri-
bution of interns and residents to hospitals. For example, Sudarshan
and Zisook (1981) write:”
Williams and his colleagues correctly point out that a great
deal of subtlety and structure in the present matching system
are probably not appreciated by the casual observer. Never-
theless, an obvious answer to their question of why the pres-
ent system and not its mirror image holds sway is apparent.
The United States suffers a terrible problem of maldistribu-
tion of physicians, with urban areas being relatively over-
” Mullin and Stalnaker (1952) report that in the first year of operation of the NIMP
procedure. IO,4 14 positions were offered through the program to 5,681 student partic-
ipants, of whom 98 percent were assigned internships by the algorithm. (They fur el
report that of these students, 84 percent received their highest-ranked choice and
another 10 percent their second choice.) By 1976, Graettinger (1976) reports that
16,112 positions were offered through the program, compared to 16,728 student par-
ticipants (of whom 11,735 were U.S. medical school graduates). In that year only 73
percent of the students (including 92 percent of the U.S. students) were matched by the
algorithm. (Each year students and hospitals who are unmatched are able to seek one
another out after the matching procedure has taken place.)
ye See Williams, Werth, and Wolff (1981),who reach a conclusion resembling
theorem 2 on the basis of some examples. By this time, Gale and Shapley’s 1962 paper
is sometimes ref.erenced in the medical literature (see n. 18). not always correctly.
However, a number of authors appeared to be aware of the equivalence of the NIMP
algorithm and the Gale-Shapley algorithm (in at least some cases reaching this conclu-
sion because of a belief that the two algorithms are the same). In Sec. VII, the difficulty
of precisely tracing the history of ideas in the literature will be briefly discussed.
” Sudarshan and Zisook (1981) wrote in response to Williams et al. (1981). They
were aware of Gale and Shapley (1962), but believed it implied that only two stable
outcomes exist, namely a hospital-optimal stable outcome and its “mirror-image” stu-
dent-optimal outcome.
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served and inner-city and rural areas being relatively under-
served. At present, although approximately 100 hospitals fill
every residency position, there are over 100 hospitals that do
not receive a single application. This maldistribution would
only be worsened by the only rational alternative to the pres-
ent matching program, the mirror-image program, which
favors students. [P. 5261
The following theorem shows that, in fact, when all preferences are
strict (so that hospital and student optimal stable outcomes exist), the
selection of a particular stable outcome will affect only which students
are assigned to which hospitals and will not have any effect on which
hospital positions are filled and which students are matched. That is,
the particular stable outcome selected will not have any influence on
the geographic distribution of matched students.
THEOREM 9: When all preferences are strict, the set of hospital
positions filled is the same at every stable outcome, as is the set of
students who are assigned positions.
This theorem is proved in Section VI.
The final issue to be considered here concerns the fact that increas-
ing numbers of medical students marry other medical students and
seek to be assigned positions in the same community. At present these
couples have two options: they may enter the centralized matching
process together and be matched by means of a special “couples al-
gorithm,” or they may elect to remain outside of the centralized pro-
cess and negotiate directly with hospital programs. In recent years,
increasing numbers of couples have adopted this second option, de-
clined to participate in the match, and managed to arrange their own
positions with hospitals.‘”
In the light of the preceding analysis, we should suspect that if
couples and hospitals both find it profitable to make their arrange-
ments outside of the matching program it must be that the couples
algorithm produces outcomes that are unstable with respect to cou-
ples. This turns out to be the case. The couples algorithm used up
until 1983 did not permit a couple to specify its preferences over pairs
of positions. Instead, each couple submitted a rank-order list for each
spouse and assigned one spouse priority in the match. Elias and Elias
(1980) discuss some of the drawbacks of this couples algorithm and
propose that it be replaced by one allowing each couple to submit a
rank-order list expressing its preferences over pairs of positions. (In
the 1983 match, couples were for the first time allowed to express
28 Quite early, Checker (1973) attributed the declining rate of participation in the
matching program partly to married couples. (Hospitals that negotiate directly with
couples may still seek to fill their remaining positions through the matching program.)
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such preferences; see the NRMP Directory [1983].)  The following re-
sult indicates, however, that even when couples are allowed to state
their preferences more accurately, the problem of finding a stable
outcome may still be intractable, since such an outcome need not
exist.
THEOREM 10: In a market in which some agents are couples, the set
of stable outcomes may be empty.
The proof is contained in Section VI.
V. The NIMP Algorithm and Proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2
The NIMP algorithm (see Stalnaker 1953; Darley 1959; NZRMP Di-
rectory 1979) works as follows. Each hospital program rank orders the
students who have applied to it (marking “X” any students who are
unacceptable) and each student rank orders the hospital programs to
which he has applied (similarly indicating any that are unacceptable).
These lists are mailed to the central clearinghouse, where they are
edited by removing from each hospital program’s rank-order list any
student who has marked that program as unacceptable and by remov-
ing from each student’s list any hospital that has indicated he is unac-
ceptable. (I am indebted to John S. Graettinger for explaining this
initial editing.) The edited lists are thus rank orderings of acceptable
alternatives.
These lists are entered into what may be thought of as a list-
processing algorithm consisting of a matching phase and a tentative-
assignment-and-update phase. The first step of the matching phase
(the 1: 1 step) checks to see if there are any students and hospital
programs that are top ranked in one another’s ranking. (If a hospital
hi has a quota of qi, then the 4; highest students in its ranking are top
ranked.) If no such matches are found, the matching phase proceeds
to the 2 : 1 step, at which the second-ranked hospital program on each
student’s ranking is compared with the top-ranked students on that
hospital’s ranking. At any step, when no matches are found the al-
gorithm proceeds to the next step, so the generic k: 1 step of the
matching phase seeks to find student-hospital pairs such that the stu-
dent is top ranked on the hospital’s ranking and the hospital is kth
ranked by the student. At any step where such matches are found, the
algorithm proceeds to the tentative-assignment-and-update phase.
When the algorithm enters the tentative-assignment-and-update
phase from the k: 1 step of the matching phase, the K: 1 matches are
tentatively made; that is, each student who is a top-ranked choice of
his kth-choice hospital is tentatively assigned to that hospital. The
rankings of the students and hospitals are then updated in the follow-
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ing way. Any hospital that a student si ranks lower than his tentative
assignment is deleted from his ranking (so the updated ranking of a
student si tentatively assigned to his kth choice now lists only his first k
choices), and student s1 is deleted from the ranking of any hospital
that was deleted from s,‘s ranking (so the updated rankings of each
hospital now include only those applicants who have not yet been
tentatively assigned to a hospital they prefer). Note that if one of a
hospital’s top-ranked candidates is deleted from its ranking, then a
lower-ranked choice moves into the top-ranked category, since the
hospital’s updated ranking has fewer students, but the same quota, as
its original ranking. When the rankings have been updated in this
way, the algorithm returns to the start of the matching phase, which
examines the updated rankings for new matches. Any new tentative
matches found in the matching phase replace prior tentative matches
involving the same student. (Note that new tentative matches can only
improve a student’s tentative assignment, since all lower-ranked hos-
pitals have been deleted from his ranking.) The algorithm terminates
when no new tentative matches are found, at which point tentative
matches become final. That is, the algorithm matches students with
the hospitals to which they are tentatively matched when the al-
gorithm terminates. Any student or hospital position that was not
tentatively matched during the algorithm is left unassigned and must
make subsequent arrangements by negotiating directly with other
unmatched students or hospitals. (See fig. 1 for a schematic of the
algorithm.)
F IG. I.--The NIMP algorithm
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The proofs of theorems 1 and 2 given below closely follow the
treatment of Gale and Shapley (1962) and together amount to a for-
mal proof that the NIMP algorithm and the,algorithm considered by
Gale and Shapley are equivalent.
P ROOF OF THEOREM 1: When the algorithm terminates, each hos-
pital hi is matched with the top qz choices (i.e., the top-ranked choices)
on its final updated rank-order list. (This follows, since the algorithm
does not terminate while tentative k: 1 matches can still be found.)
This assignment is stable, since any student s1 whom some hospital h,
originally ranked higher than one of its final assignees was deleted
from h,‘s ranking when sj was given a tentative assignment higher in
his ranking than h,. Hence the final assignment gives s, a position he
ranked higher than he ranked hi. So the final outcome is not unstable
with respect to any such h, and .>.
P ROOF OF THEOREM 2: To prove the first part of the theorem, it will
be sufficient to show that no achievable student is ever deleted from a
hospital program’s rank-order list, so that the final assignment gives
each hospital program its best achievable assignments. This can be
seen by induction. Suppose that, ‘up to the rth iteration of the al-
gorithm, no student has been deleted from the ranking of a hospital
for which he is achievable, and that on the (r + I)st iteration student s1
is tentatively matched with hospital h, and deleted from the ranking of
hospital hk. Then any assignment that matches s1 with hh and assigns
achievable matches to h, is unstable, since s1 ranked h, higher than hk
and h, ranked s, higher than at least one of its assignees. (This follows
since s, was top ranked by h, at the end of the rth iteration, when no
achievable students had yet been deleted from h,‘s rank-order list.) So
s, is not achievable for hk.
The second part of the theorem is now straightforward, since any
outcome y that some s, likes less than the hospital-optimal outcome x is
unstable if the hospital x(sl) is assigned some student at y whom it likes
less than s,.
Corollary 2.1 follows in a straightforward way by considering the
NIMP algorithm with the roles of students and hospitals reversed, so
that each student is treated as a hospital with one position to offer and
each hospital is treated as a student with qz top-ranked choices.
VI. Proofs of Theorems 8,9, and 10
P ROOF OF THEOREM 8: Consider the market in which there are three
hospitals, H = {h,, hp, hs},each offering one position, and three stu-
dents,  S = {si, ~2, ss}. Hospital hl is indifferent between s1 and s2,
whom it prefers to s3, that is, slZ(hl)spP(hl)s3. Hospital h2 strictly pre-
fers s1 to ss to sp, while h3 prefers s:, to ss to si. The preferences of
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the students are given by hrP(sr)h2P(sr)hs,  hlP(s2)h3P(s2)h2,  and
hlP(s3)h2P(sS)hz~. There are exactly two stable outcomes in this market,
xandy, given byx(sr)  = h1,x(s2)  = h3,x(s3) = h2,x(hl) = sl,x(h2) = sg,
x(h) = ~2, andy(sd  = hy(s2)  = hl,y(sd  = b,y(hl)  = s2,y(M  = ~1,
y(hs) = ss. Hospital h, is indifferent between its assignment at x and at
y, while hospital h2 and student sp prefer y to x, and hospital h3 and
students s1 and ,5s prefer x toy. So each stable outcome is pref-erred  to
the other by some students and some hospitals.
PROOF OF THEOREM 9: For any outcome t, let P(z) denote the set of
hospital positions filled at z. (To make the definition precise, let the qi
identical positions offered by hospital program h, be numbered, so
that if k of these positions are filled at z they are taken to be the$rst k
positions.) Letp(z) = [P(z)1  be the number of positions filled. Similarly
let Q(z) denote the set of students assigned to positions at outcome z,
and let q(z) denote their number (so n - q[z] students are unmatched
at z). Let x be the hospital-optimal stable outcome, and let y be the
student-optimal stable outcome; both exist since all preferences are
strict. Then theorem 2 implies that P(x) contains P(z) for all stable
outcomes z, and consequently p(x)  > p(z). This latter inequality im-
plies q(x) 3 q(z) for all stable outcomes z, since every position is filled
by exactly one student, that is, since p(z)  = q(z) for every outcome 2.
Theorem 2 also implies that Q(x) is contained in Q(z)  for all stable
outcomes z, so q(x) 6 q(z). Hence Q(x) = Q(z) for all stable z; that is,
the set of students who are assigned positions is equal to Q(x) at every
stable outcome z. But q(x) = q(z), and hence p(x) = p(z) for every
stable outcome z. Since P(x) contains P(z), P(z) = P(x) for all stable z:
the set of hospital positions filled at any stable outcome z is equal to
P(x).
PROOF OF THEOREM 10: Consider the market with hospitals H = {h,,
hp, h3, h4}, each of which offers exactly one position and each of which
has strict preferences over students S = { 1, 2,3,4}  as given in table 2.
The students consist of two married couples, { 1, 2) and (3, 4). Each
couple has strict preferences over ordered pairs of hospitals, as given
in table 2. Thus couple { 1, 2) have as their first choice that student 1
be matched with hl and student 2 with h2, and have as their last choice
that student 1 be matched with hp and student 2 with h,. The 24
possible assignments of students to hospitals are listed in table 3,
along with the reason each such outcome is unstable. Thus outcome 1,
which assigns student i to hospital h,, i = 1, . . , 4, is unstable because
both hospital h2 and couple (3, 4) would prefer that student 4 be
matched with hp. (This follows since h2 prefers student 4 to student 2,
and (3, 4) prefers h3h2 to h3h4.) Note that the emptiness of the set of
stable outcomes here is not a “knife-edge” phenomenon. The ex-
ample would be completely unchanged, for instance, if any prefer-
ences for h2 that kept student 4 as the first choice were substituted.
TABLE 2
PREFERENCES OF HOSPITALS  AND COUPLES
hl
4
2
1
3
HOSPITALS ’ RANK ORDERS
h:! hs
4 2
3 3
2 1
1 4
h4
2
4
1
3
COUPLES ’ RANK ORDERS
11, 21 I3,41
h,hs h&
Wl, h&s
Us h&l
h&z hh
hih4 h&z
h,hs h&a
h&4 h&4
Ml hzh,
h&z h&s
h&s hlhz
h&4 hlh4
h&, h,h3
TABLE 3
EVERY OUTCOME Is UNSTABLE
Outcome 111 hz h3 h4 Unstable with respect to:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
3
3
4
4
1
1
3
3
4
4
1
1
2
2
4
4
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
4
2
4
2
3
3
4
1
4
1
3
2
4
1
4
1
2
2
3
1
3
1
2
4
3
4
2
3
2
4
3
4
1
3
1
4
2
4
1
2
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
4. h2
4, h2
2, h4
4,h
2, h4
4, h,
4, h,
4, hs
2, h4
4, h
2, h4
4, h,
4, h2
2, h3
2, h4
2, h:,
1, h,
2, h,
4, hz
2, h3
2, h4
2, hs
3, h
4, h4
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VII. Concluding Remarks
‘013
The NIMP algorithm, which was adopted in 1951, produces the hos-
pital-optimal outcome in the core of the market. It is therefore
noteworthy that the core was not formally defined as an independent
solution concept in game theory until 2 years later, in the work of
Gillies  (1953a,  19536) and Shapley (1953). The fact that the core was
so structured in such markets as to contain optimal outcomes of this
kind was not known until the work of Gale and Shapley (1962). The
kinds of incentive questions that prompted the replacement of the
1950 trial-run algorithm were not commonly discussed in economics
until at least 10 years later (see Green and Laffont [ 19791 for a sur-
vey), and the specific incentive properties of stable procedures in
markets of this kind have been well understood only in the last few
years.*’ It is difficult to say precisely what was known about the NIMP
algorithm when it was implemented, since the associated literature
contains a number of correct assertions about its properties, alongside
other assertions that are incorrect. However, it is clear that several
ideas that subsequently became important in economic theory were
earlier encountered in the course of organizing this medical labor
market.30
A number of the contemporary problems arising in the medical
labor market raise theoretical questions that seem likely to have more
general significance. Perhaps the most topical of these is the problem
of two-career couples referred to in the previous section. Since
theorem 10 applies to quite general kinds of labor markets, some of
the changes caused by increasing numbers of dual-career households
in other labor markets may prove related to those discussed here.
” There has been a considerable amount of recent independent work on incentives
and other questions concerning matching problems. A nonconstructive proof of the
existence of stable outcomes is given by Quinzii (1982) for a general class of games
including both marriage markets and exchange economies with indivisibilities of the
kind studied in Shapley and Scarf (1974). Roth and Postlewaite (1977). and Roth
(19826). Theorem 3 has been independently obtained by Bergstrom and Manning
(1982); a strengthening of theorem 5 to include coalitions has been discussed by Dubins
and Freedman (198 1) and Ritz (1982), and Gale and Sotomayor ( 1983) make an obser-
vation analogous to theorem 9. Similar results are explored by Demange and Gale
(1983) for a related model of matching, and I am indebted to David Gale for informing
me that he and M. Sotomayor have obtained some results similar to those in Sec.
IV. The structure of the set of stable outcomes in general markets of this kind is ex-
plored in Roth (1984a).
3o One of the goals expressed for the NIMP procedure was that it should achieve the
same outcome as an orderly free market (see the brief historical review in Graettinger
and Peranson 1981). Since it achieves an outcome in the core, there is a well-defined
sense in which this goal is achieved. Partly because of the two-sided nature of labor
markets, such a procedure is quite different from similarly motivated procedures for
one-sided markets, as when students are to be assigned to dormitories (see Hylland and
Zeckhauser 1979; Leonard 1983).
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Another contemporary problem concerns adapting the matching
procedure to the market for advanced residency positions, which are
less homogeneous than positions for first-year graduates.31  And there
remain open questions about the market ‘described here and the
forces prompting the adoption of this particular form of market or-
ganization. Specifically, the precise role that salary adjustments play
in this market is still unclear, as are the market features that pre-
vented salaries alone from clearing the market in an orderly way in
the late 194Os.‘*
In conclusion, it bears repeating that the history of rule changes a
market has undergone provides a valuable perspective from which to
view the forces at work in the market. Game theory, which is the part
of economic theory most explicitly concerned with the implications of
different rules of organization, p r o v i d e s  a  n a t u r a l  t h e o r e t i c a l
f r a m e w o r k  t o  s t u d y  t h e s e  c h a n g e s .
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